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Brexit and the Future of UK Economic Innovation 
 
Given the current uncertainty, perhaps the best way to approach this question is 
to consider what the scope for the current government to make a difference to 
the environment of innovation is, and also how this in turn is influenced or 
framed by a general attitude or framework of how an economy operates. 
 
So far we only have the early October 2016 Conservative Party conference and 
various press briefings to go on. Perhaps the best point of contrast to apply to 
this is the Budget Report, March 2016 - since this is the main post-referendum 
articulation of the previous leadership. 
 
The general approach articulated by the new leadership seems to be (at least as a 
public discourse) to take the optimistic position that leaving the EU removes 
barriers to trade and constraints on economic dynamism in the UK (not quite the 
Minford doctrine of the minority of economists who supported leave, but the 
broad outlines are not dissimilar). The implication is that the UK will simply leap 
into action. Swathes of entrepreneurs who have been sat on their hands or 
gnashing their teeth because of an oppressive EU will leap up and suddenly 
flourish (Liam Fox is exhorting business to take up the challenge in a ‘post-
geography trading world’).  
 
This contradicts the previous position that being in the EU helped to develop the 
UK as an outward looking open economy - on the basis that the EU accounts for 
44% of UK exports; a position clearly stated in the last Budget Report under 
Cameron, March 2016, p. 11 and 19.  Page 19 provided the main statement 
regarding the Remain position within the Budget Report.   
 
Though the current narrative emphasises that the UK is being liberated and 
control is being reclaimed, the underlying theoretical tenets of the role of the 
state and the nature of an economy remain broadly the same (it is just the 
positioning of the EU that is altered). That is, liberalised trading as a competitive 
framework. This may ultimately become meta-market thinking without 
necessarily the single market (if ‘hard Brexit’ occurs) 
 
The basic premise is that corporations in the UK will (once uncertainty and fear 
are put aside) increase their investment and turn to trade outside the EU and 
new corporations will locate in the UK. 
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In terms of innovation, specific new policy stated at the October conference 
include: 
 
£220 million for additional support for technical/technological innovation 
£100 million for biomedical funding 
£120 million for technical/technological transfer from universities to foster 
innovation 
 
However, this needs to be placed in context. The UK is a £1.8 trillion economy 
(5th or 9th economy in the world); with a total budget of around £ 750 billion. The 
state accounts for around 40% of the economy (and is carrying net debt of 83% 
of GDP). These new commitments are small. 
 
At the conference, the new Chancellor, Philip Hammond, announced ‘we are 
ready to provide support to British business’ but did not suggest how… It seems 
reasonable, therefore, to assume the policy framework remains influenced by the 
same approach to economics that dominated prior to the new leadership (not 
least because that approach has endured in various forms for more than 30 
years) 
 
The new Prime Minister, Theresa May, meanwhile, announced that her 
government will specifically seek to ensure that those left behind by the 
economic growth of recent decades will have their grievances addressed (there 
will be more of a sense of ‘fairness’) 
 
She also stated there would be a new ‘industrial strategy’ - implying also policy 
to address the differences in economic experience of the regions. She did not 
actually state what this would be. However, it is to be led by Greg Clark 
(secretary of state for business, energy and industrial strategy). [Issue: strategy 
is not a set of vacuous mission statements, it is a diagnosis of some problem area, 
a set of principles to guide how it is addressed, and a set of subsequent coherent 
policies or actions consistent with the principles. It is an open question as to 
whether the government has an industrial strategy. They are however, 
influenced by principles regarding the role of the state for and in terms of an 
economy] 
 
Since we are in Leeds one ought also to consider the Northern Powerhouse 
initiative. Its main champion, former Chancellor Osborne, has been sidelined, 
whilst one of its main architects, Jim O’Neill has resigned from his Treasury 
advisory role (mainly over Hinkley). However, the core of the Northern 
Powerhouse idea was investment in transport and digital infrastructure, as well 
as the devolution of decision making in order to create a flexible localised system 
and empower a more effective business friendly environment. This is unlikely to 
change because it is consistent with Theresa May’s rhetoric and with the limits 
on what industrial strategy is likely to be. Again, a great deal of what was in the 
Budget Report March 2016 (p. 77) will probably be unaffected.  
 
So, the new government’s response is likely to be a combination of a new policy 
narrative about fairness and opportunity, continuity in terms of what they are 
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currently doing at a regional level, and continuity in terms of the general 
framework of how an economy is conceived (see also below).   
 
However this “change without change” by no means indicates the future will be 
like the past. The consequences of continuity involve also an attempt to manage 
Brexit (which is in many ways a damage limitation exercise), and to do so based 
on a received framework. 
  
The UK is a mixed economy so it is neither all one thing nor all another - but 
dominant ideas have influenced the development of the economy… how it 
changes how innovation arises 
 
The guiding theory of the last thirty years has been that: 
  
1. Government is like a household and must balance its books. This restricts 
capital spending (and does so in further ways since the idea of a fiscal 
stimulus is always constrained by the way inflation is modelled and 
addressed - this is built into DSGEs and used to guide monetary policy 
through the Bank of England - Bank independence is not neutral in its 
effects, monetary policy implicitly dominates fiscal opportunity within 
contemporary economics and policy frameworks. This has become basic 
to fiscal ‘discipline’)  
2. Government tends to misallocate resources and so should minimise the 
resources it directly invests or controls (one should prefer market failure 
to government failure).   
 
This has meant that over the last thirty years the governments main ideological 
position has been that the state helps to create and support markets, and that 
markets create the basis for efficient investment and allocation of resources, and 
in turn motivate entrepreneurial individuals to create firms, and for firms to 
‘innovate’ - a dynamic efficiency. This may start in some places but eventually 
expands across different geographies because it gradually becomes more cost 
effective to shift resources to new regions as established ones become more 
expensive to operate from. An open economy is open within and open beyond 
itself…   
 
The broad consequences of this approach have been:  
 
 A withdrawal of the state from ownership or control: the government acts 
as a ‘partner’ and covers private risk (typically this means contracts 
which transfer risk to the state whilst guaranteeing long term capacity to 
make profits to corporations), the government creates loan systems 
(quasi banks and investment funds for particular purposes - the Green 
Bank etc), and provides incentives and some subsidy. Ultimately the 
government seeks to steer rather than own or control major sectors of the 
economy (notably energy production)  
 A constraint on expansionary or active fiscal policy - we have capital 
spending but it is permanently affected by short-term compromise (sub-
contraction, public-private partnerships etc), which affects the nature of 
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infrastructure decisions, and it is permanently affected by the attempt to 
treat the state as a household (concepts such as the multiplier, merit 
goods, and public goods become incoherent - though never disappear 
entirely, since the state remains a £750 billion actor)  
 
More specific consequences include: 
 
 A reduction or constraint on active industrial policy (this has affected 
manufacturing in the UK a great deal of which is now component 
production or assembly for MNEs in supply chains (Nissan, GKN etc)1 It is 
these that May embraced as strategically important businesses at the 
conference. These are to be ‘supported’ (car manufacturers, aerospace - 
which includes the arms industry though this is rarely emphasised 
outside security circles) along with university to business start up 
transfers - biomedical science, digital economy etc as previously noted 
 A reduction or constraint on active regional policy, we are still waiting for 
equalisations through mainly market processes… deindustrialisation has 
not resulted in renewal or transformation in general… This is not to 
denigrate the achievements and vibrancy of some areas in the North, but 
rather to recognize the broader reality 
 A centrifugal economy, dominated by London (more than 20% of UK GDP 
from a population of 8.6 million) and the South East     
 A pathological evolution of our economy - metaphorically described as 
unbalanced, or structurally distorted (hence the frequent references to 
rebalancing and structural reform by governments (by which they mean 
steered evolution) especially since the GFC - as Colin Hay notes. This lack 
of balance has manifested as the gradual rise in significance of finance and 
financial services, an increasing proportion of the private sector economy 
dominated by retail (the biggest employer at around 2.7m, with the big 4 
supermarkets accounting for around 1m) and then by construction 
(1.8m).  
                                                        
1 Noting: The manufacturing industry employs around 2.6 million people in the UK and, in 2013, 
accounted for 10% or £150.7 billion of national economic output. Manufacturing has 
underperformed the services sector for many years. Output in the sector declined particularly 
sharply during the 2008/09 recession, and after a short period of growth it declined again in 
early of 2012, 2013 and 2014 have seen relatively strong growth. Almost 70% of Research & 
Development investment is in the manufacturing sector, and goods produced in the sector 
account for 44% of all UK exports.  (Manufacturing: Statistics and Policy, 2015: pp. 4-5; House of 
Commons Briefing Paper 1942, C. Rhodes) 
 5 
 
 
 
Innovation has come to involve: 
 
 Conflation with financial innovation - something with questionable social 
value (a problem now increasingly recognized though little has been done 
to change the dominance and influence of finance despite persistent 
formalised criticism and more oversight - macroprudential approaches, 
ring fencing etc have been steadily diluted) 
 A more general conflation of innovation with the narrative of dynamic 
visionary entrepreneurs engaged in industry wide disruption - the wealth 
creators (Branson, Dyson etc). This is despite that this is the minority of 
actual business and employment (around 60% of private sector 
employment is in SMEs; most of the private sector is not ‘cutting edge’ 
design or technology and much of that is now outsourced and produced 
elsewhere in the world including Dyson, adding to the issue that the 
corporate sector is MNEs not UKEs - leaving the EU is actually to create a 
barrier in this sense). Only 11% of UK companies are actually exporters.    
 Are most SMEs and sole traders a source of innovation? They are part of 
GDP but an innovative haircut is not quite the same thing as building 
Google. I’m not denigrating it, but consider the range… (both are cultural, 
but they are not within the same concepts of business structure). One 
must also consider that 16% of the population are now self-employed… 
This creates a challenge in terms of addressing wealth creation and 
wealth capture through work. If one is concerned by wealth and income 
distribution can one only think in terms of traditional ideas of shifts 
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between left and right, if read as affecting the balance between unions 
and corporations etc (14% of private sector workers are in unions)? 
 
The UK also has a reputation for primary discoveries in science, for its creative 
industries (gaming, films and TV), for culture; and perhaps despite rather than 
because of education policy over the last decade, the quality of many of its 
universities.  
 
This brings us back to Brexit: is it likely to be a profound transformation in how 
we approach supporting or fostering innovation?    
 
Clearly the answer is yes and no - though Brexit itself has not been directly about 
encouraging innovation. 
 
It should not be neglected that:  We haven’t yet left the EU  
 
Whilst there is some credence in the claim that Brexit so far has not been as bad 
as some thought, this is simply in terms of immediate market panic and effects 
on consumer behaviour. The indicators one looks at are the FTSE (volatile but 
not crashed), currency (significant Sterling decline - 18% from 23rd June to 
October 11th) consumption (so far mainly unaffected), business investment 
(long term seems to already be reducing, but short term inventory measures 
though volatile are not yet on a significant downward trend based on purchasing 
managers indexes PMI - since these respond to the media and consumer 
behaviour because the data is surveyed from managers who are as influenced as 
any other member of the public by negative and positive news, this is 
unsurprising). These all involve what Keynes used to call problems for the MEC 
and issues of convention and investment behaviour (animal spirits etc albeit in a 
world of technical and algorithmic trading where some capital markets are now 
essentially cyberspirits - hence the flashcrash in sterling). One can, however, 
expect inflation because of our trade profile and this will likely also affect foreign 
holdings of UK sovereign debt (as inflation rises, non-index linked bonds real 
return reduces, they may, therefore, be sold off. Leading to rises in yield curves - 
ultimately creating a problem that UK debt becomes less attractive on markets 
irrespective e of its credit rating (another problem issue for the future).  
 
The real issue regarding Brexit concerns the institutional form that the UK’s new 
relation with the EU and the rest of the world takes after the initial period of 
uncertainty is resolved (though this will not be an end to uncertainty merely a 
change in what is uncertain). Theresa May’s announcement of a Great Reform 
Bill is an announcement of a time threshold. It lacks substance so it is not 
actually a direct answer that resolves uncertainty. ‘Brexit means Brexit’ remains 
essentially empty at this stage…   
 
Thereafter, there are many reasons why prospects are problematic…  
 
Consider the key personnel: 
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 Liam Fox, International Trade (remit outside EU but cannot act officially 
since the UK is a WTO member via the EU and the EU represents the UK 
on trade with member states) 
 David Davis, Department for Exiting the EU (cannot formally negotiate 
with individual members of the EU since negotiation of the form of exit, 
and by implication, subsequent relations with the EU must first be agreed 
between EU members. This is a matter for the Commission, the Council 
and the Parliament - at some stage they require a unanimous position 
based on the remaining 27 members - e.g. Guy Verhofstadt is the 
designated lead negotiator for the European Parliament) 
 Boris Johnson, Foreign Secretary (is empowered to encourage trade 
relations via diplomatic activity, but is not actually responsible for 
agreements and lacks the authority to make binding commitments) 
 Philip Hammond, Chancellor (responsible for the budget response to 
radical change in UK - after payments to the EU and payments from the 
EU cease; and within the general response to short and long term 
consequences of leaving EU). 
 Amber Rudd, Home Secretary (will oversee immigration policy and status 
of residents) 
 
And Oliver Robbins, chief civil servant for Brexit 
 
Problems: 
 
1. Strictly speaking no one can engage in formal talks with specific states 
inside or outside the EU in order to develop actual trade treaties.  
2. There are clearly mis-communications between departments and 
personnel, and also a vying for influence and resources between the 
different responsible parties. There is no collective position. There are 
also problems over the special status for interest groups - passporting for 
finance2, free (or at least freer than others) movement of labour for 
finance (and perhaps agriculture) 
3. Even if (when) a collective position emerges - wanting an outcome does 
not mean one is able to achieve that outcome. Negotiation requires other 
parties to be amenable to your goals. Much of actual trade already 
conforms to EU and WTO rule systems. Leaving the EU simply changes the 
terms of access based on those rule systems, but then requires also 
specific treaties with each trading party (to replace a collective EU 
position). This will not be a freeing from ‘red tape’ - merely a change in 
the power position of the UK (clearly recognized p. 19 of the March 2016 
Budget Report) 
                                                        
2 The issue currently hinges for finance on the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II 
(MFIDII) that comes into force in 2018 and, notably the status of ‘equivalence’. If UK qualifies as 
an equivalent regulatory regime then it is possible financial services will have right to operate in 
each EU member state. However, equivalence is open to interpretation and could be made 
conditional on conformity to other EU initiatives. Uncertainty here is problematic even if one 
thinks the UK has a ‘finance curse’ or dependency. 25% of UK financial services revenue derives 
from the EU and the finance sector provides £60billion of UK tax revenues in one way or another.   
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4.  Negotiating trade deals even with cooperative and willing partners is an 
intensive and long affair - the recent EU Canada trade deal took 7 years. 
The technical aspects of setting out an actual treaty form for the UK in 
relation to 27 EU members or the EU as a whole, and also perhaps with 
reference to the 50 third party trade agreements that the EU has, is a 
prodigious undertaking, even if there were (will be) a clear basis for 
negotiation (what each side wants and how this is to be set out in initial 
regulatory form) 
  
Two likely immediate policy areas that will likely be emphasised as ‘good news’ 
in forthcoming months: 
 
 Bringing forward some capital spending on infrastructure is expansionary 
fiscal policy only in the narrowest sense. It is the same spending over a 
shorter and nearer timeframe. Consider the context. Delaying meeting 
deficit reduction targets is not the same as expansionary fiscal policy. It is 
still an austerity approach - what is termed ‘fiscal consolidation’ 
 Housebuilding and reducing planning restrictions are not ‘innovation’. 
They may result in more houses being built. There may contribute to a 
local multiplier and some popularity based on reducing housing pressure. 
But the government is not envisaging a broad programme of state 
sponsored housebuilding, social housing etc and the total builds involved 
are not likely to be sufficient to solve the housing stock shortage that has 
accumulated (and become part of our unstable debt-based asset 
economy). 
 
Consider also the meaning and distribution of consequences from austerity 
(since the overall direction of policy is not likely to change): 
 
Much of the reduction in welfare spending (rather than capital spending) has 
traded on a policy narrative of division and blame. It began with an ‘We are all in 
this together’. This was then qualified with a: ‘but there are those not pulling 
their weight who can be targeted and this is in their own best interests’. 
‘Hardworking families’ has become a trope. It is a trope that implies the chief 
targets of austerity are benefit layabouts. And to this has been added immigrants 
gaming the system of welfare and a large swathe of those excluded from work by 
a dysfunctional welfare system that can be supported back into work. The 
underlying theme is that we can differentiate the deserving and undeserving as 
though this were simple and that the undeserving will be the chief targets of 
policy. This masks the actual nature of austerity as lived experience. Putting 
aside the immigration issue, changes to working tax credits, outsourcing the 
monitoring of eligibility for welfare payments (to private sector firms 
incentivised to deny welfare eligibility), changes to childcare eligibility, the 
bedroom tax, and changes to disability benefit eligibility tests are in no clear 
sense targeted at some moral panic construct of layabouts. They affect someone 
in almost every extended family in the country and asymmetrically affect the 
vulnerable.   
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Also consider what this focus is not. Recipients of state support did not run 
banks, or create Collateralised Debt Obligations, or Credit Default Swaps. They 
did not pillage corporate revenues via special dividends and decimate the 
pension schemes of those corporations. They didn’t invent zero hour contracts, 
they didn’t agree among themselves how to accelerate executive compensation 
(and to create one way bet incentive schemes that harmed the businesses they 
were (are) supposedly stewards of). They didn’t fix Libor, they didn’t sell 
payment protection insurance that no one needed. And they have not had the 
resources to bankroll politicians and thing tanks and positional reports…  
 
To paraphrase von Clausewitz, austerity is economic warfare, a continuation of 
politics by other means.  
 
Overall then, Theresa May is opting for a business as usual approach that 
probably won’t please business (the new fairness agenda is already causing 
nervousness at the CBI and IoD), and that because of its constraints through 
Brexit and through how an economy is conceived, is unlikely to deliver 
significant improvements in the economy in terms of the distribution of wealth 
and income.  
 
The very idea of ‘innovation’ is positioned and confused.  
  
In quite a different way, one might argue that the major innovations of recent 
times have helped to create the problems we are now experiencing.  
 
We live in increasingly polarised societies that encourage confirmation bias. 
Social media allows us to seek out the likeminded and to shape the information 
and opinion we are exposed to as a mutually reinforcing construction of strongly 
held belief. This creates dichotomies - those with and those against - that tends 
to put aside actual reasoned debate and evidence. Michael Goves’ ‘we are all tired 
of experts’ or Donald Trump’s bombastic ignorance are symptoms of something 
more pervasive and deeply dangerous for any functioning democracy. The 
willingness to see another point of view and consider the basis of argument…  
 
The problem has not been helped by the deep sense of disenfranchisement 
created in the last decade. We have only had one year in the last 9 where a 
recognized leader has led government. That is in the sense that the democratic 
system actually put forward someone a ‘majority’ (in a first past the post sense) 
voted for. Gordon Brown came to power without election in 2007, was defeated 
in 2010, and replaced by a coalition government led by David Cameron 2010 to 
2015. Cameron actually won a majority (12) in 2015, but resigned in June 2016 
and was replaced by Theresa May in July.  This raises a deep issue of legitimacy 
and mandate despite Brexit 
   
Appended extracts from the March 2016 Budget Report: 
 
From p. 11: 
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1.11 The UK is one of the most open trading economies in the world and is not immune 
to the weaker global outlook. And as in other major advanced economies, the UK’s 
productivity growth has been slower since the financial crisis. Combined, this means 
that the challenge of delivering a sustained rise in living standards following the 
financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 is greater here in the UK than the OBR previously 
forecast, with GDP growth, inflation and nominal GDP growth now forecast to be weaker 
than at the time of the Spending Review and Autumn Statement 2015.13  
 
 
From p. 15: 
  
1.23 In the UK, debt levels remain high. Short-term, discretionary fiscal stimulus would 
simply increase public debt without expanding supply.  
1.24 Furthermore, the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC) forecasts inflation to return to 
the 2% target in the medium term. As the Governor of the Bank of England has recently 
said, “the G20 needs to use the time purchased by monetary policy to develop a coherent 
and urgent approach to supply-side policies”. 
1.25 The long-term solution is structural reform. These policies seek to make economies 
more efficient, competitive and productive. Both the IMF and OECD recognise that 
structural reform is needed to boost long-term growth. Their research shows that the 
most effective structural reforms include lowering the rates of distortive taxes, ensuring 
that product markets are flexible and competitive, and cutting or simplifying business 
regulation. These policies are critical to delivering sustainable growth for the next 
generation.  
 
From p. 16: 
 
1.27 This Budget announces further measures to drive productivity growth across the 
UK:   
 reducing distortive taxes by continuing to lower both income tax and business 
taxes 
 improving education by accelerating fairer schools funding and committing to 
full academisation of schools in England 
 promoting enterprise through business rate cuts for small businesses, cutting 
Capital Gains Tax and extending entrepreneurs’ relief to external investors in 
unlisted trading companies 
 delivering long-term infrastructure improvements, by giving the green light to 
major projects recommended by the National Infrastructure Commission 
including Crossrail 2, and High Speed 3 between Leeds and Manchester  
 improving economic decision-making by devolving power to cities and regions, 
including new devolution deals for the East and West of England 
 
[This is basic supply side economics, as the Report also notes is a preferred and more 
effective approach than significant fiscal stimulus] 
 
From p. 17: 
Regional rebalancing 
1.32 Regional economic disparities have long been a problem, with London and the 
South East having higher growth than the UK average for decades. The government is 
determined to rebalance the economy by building the Northern Powerhouse and the 
government’s devolution revolution is creating powerful elected mayors, allowing local 
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governments to reduce and retain business rates, and giving local leaders across the 
country new powers and rewards for driving local growth.  
 From p 19: 
 
Economic opportunities and risks linked to the UK’s 
membership of the European Union  
Membership of the EU has increased the UK’s openness to trade and investment, 
reinforcing the dynamism of the economy. The Treasury has highlighted openness as a 
key driver of productivity, wages and living standards. The UK’s full access to the single 
market, through its EU membership, clearly increases the openness of the British 
economy, creating jobs and supporting livelihoods. At the February 2016 European 
Council, the Prime Minister secured a new settlement for the UK in a reformed EU. The 
agreement covered four key areas: economic governance; competitiveness; sovereignty; 
and welfare and free movement. Together, the new settlement and the UK’s existing opt-
outs from the single currency and common border-free area give the UK a special status 
in the EU. Voting to leave the EU would create a profound economic shock and years of 
economic uncertainty. Such a vote would be the start of a series of lengthy, interlocking 
negotiations with the EU and with other international partners. The associated 
uncertainty would have a material effect on jobs, the economy and the public finances. 
Some of the concerns related to such an outcome are already becoming apparent in 
financial markets. In their discussion of external analysis of the impact of an exit from 
the EU the OBR conclude that “Leaving aside the debate over the long-term impact of 
‘Brexit’, there appears to be a greater consensus that a vote to leave would result in a 
period of potentially disruptive uncertainty while the precise details of the UK’s new 
relationship with the EU were negotiated”  
The UK’s current full access to the single market cannot be matched by any existing 
alternative. UK firms and consumers enjoy tariff-free trade and reductions in non-tariff 
barriers across the EU. The UK is also inside the customs union, eliminating the need for 
customs compliance for trade between EU member states. None of the alternative 
arrangements with the EU would provide the same level of access, particularly for 
services, which accounts for 79% of the UK economy. A new relationship which gives 
the UK the access to the single market that it needs would involve contributing 
financially to the EU, accepting the free movement of people and adopting EU rules 
without having any say over them.  
 
In their discussion of current risks and uncertainties the OBR highlight that “whatever 
the long-term pros and cons of the UK’s membership of the European Union, a vote to 
leave in the forthcoming referendum could usher in an extended period of uncertainty 
regarding the precise terms of the UK’s future relationship with the EU. This could have 
negative implications for activity via business and consumer confidence and might 
result in greater volatility in financial and other asset markets” The OBR note that, 
reflecting their statutory remit to prepare forecasts based on current government 
policy, it is not for them to judge at this stage what the impact of leaving the EU might be 
on the economy and public finances.  
 
Remaining in a reformed EU will make the UK stronger, safer and better off. It will allow 
a reformed EU to continue supporting UK productivity. And it will offer certainty for UK 
businesses and consumers and those foreign firms investing in the UK. As Christine 
Lagarde, the Managing Director of the IMF has made clear, a vote to leave the EU would 
create uncertainty in the UK: “no economic player likes uncertainty. They don’t invest, 
they don’t hire, they don’t make decisions in times of uncertainty.  
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